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THE NEW CULTURE CONCEPT AND MARXIAN
SOCIALISM
BY WILLIAM NATHANSON
MAN is a being in whom two tendencies have always struggled
for supremacy ; first a tendency to construct things which
would make his life more comfortable, and secondly a tendency to
discover the meaning and purpose of life.
Because of the first tendency he has been called homo faber, the
man of mechanics ; and because of the second tendency he has been
called homo-sapience, the man of reason. Whenever the tendency
of man to make life more comfortable by all manner of inventions
becomes strong at the expense of the tendency to deepen life's con-
tent and to make it spiritually beautiful, "fabrication" or civilization
gains the upper hand over "sapience" or culture, and man becomes
empty and spiritually degraded.
In every era, in which only things human have been stressed,
natural science and civilization won prominence, for both serve the
practical side of life—that side which finds expression only in the
concept of utility. That is the form of life to which science pays
the closest attention and to which it is devoted with indescribable
loyalty.
But when in a certain epoch the superhuman, the spiritual, be-
gins to dominate, when there is an increase of people in whose hearts
is found an echo of that "small, still voice" which allows itself to
be heard in the soul-depths of the sages of that epoch, then soul-
searching and culture predominates. Stress is then laid on the spec-
ulative side of life, which regards only values.
Values stand in direct contrast to uses. Objects and events which
are useless for the practical side of life, with its superficialities and
limitations, are nevertheless invaluable to the speculative side, which
is profound and infinite.
Thus Oscar Wilde thanked God for having caused society to in-
carcerate him, not because of the utilities which prison afforded
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him, but because of the great spiritual awakeniuor that prison hfc
brought to him. His hymn of praise to God and his acceptance of
prison as a grant of favor came from the reahzation that all the
pains and trials which beset him "in battalions" led to the revelation
of new values in life. Life acquired for him an entirely new mean-
ing.
And only that human activity can be truly termed culture which
aims above all to become aware of the meaning and value of life, of
the essence and purposiveness of the universe.
Civilization differs from culture in its emphasis upon things
human instead of things superhuman, things mundane instead of
things supermundane, practical rather than speculative. Civilization
is concerned with the material aspect of the universe ; culture seeks
to identify itself with the innermost aspect of reality.
The second half of the nineteenth century is marked by the
greater and more powerful role assumed by civilization as against
culture. Between, approximately, 18.^0 and 1900 civilization domi-
nated almost uninterruptedly the spirit and soul, the heart and mind
of humanity. That was the period when man threw himself with
out reserve into the quest for well-being, thinking that therein he
would find happiness. He looked upon all the discoveries and in-
ventions of the lightning strides of science merely as the means for
increasing the comforts of his earthly life, and of lending to his
external existence more glow and luster.
Man ai)andoned the quest for si)iritual values coming from the
great world within to reap the full harvest of his victory over the
external world. He was taken away from his real self bv the manv
triumphs OAcr inanimate nature. She who had been silent for mil-
leniums began to speak and to reveal her many secrets. All the
hitherto undreamed of achievements in the realms which are devoted
mainly to the material world estranged man from the spiritual worM,
which stretches into the depths and knows of no length or breadth.
That world, in which the entire interest w?s given onlv to the si?-
nificant, the everlasting, and to all that made for profound and im-
pressive experience, became subject to a world in which the chief
role was taken by the immediate and transitory and in which pleasure
and ease were the goal of every human activity. Man became blind
to everything that gave life an inner beauty and glory, and to that
which could have opened up for him an inexhaustible fountain of
true bliss.
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With all its magnificent attainments in its various spheres of
human activity, the nineteenth century cannot boast of many achieve-
ments in the cultural sphere. Particularly in its latter half, the nine-
teenth century produced nothing which could refresh anew the
human soul and which could, as if by magic, elevate the human spirit
into the infinite heavens, and make man feel a certain relation be-
tween himself and the world above him. Yet this is just what
Spinoza did in the seventeenth century and Kant, Fichte, and Hegel
toward the end of the eighteenth century and beginning of the
nineteenth century.
Since then humanity sacrificed almost its entire energy for its
material satisfaction. Its greatest purpose and highest aim became
the conquest of the external world, with a view toward deriving
from it all that could help to make human life more comfortable,
more pleasant, and more contented. The foremost if not the sole
aim of the leaders of humanity during the last epoch, was only to
conquer and exploit nature in such a way as to multiply the utilities
which man could draw from her. In this period, civilization prog-
ressed very rapidly, with all its tangible results and effective utili-
ties. As in the growth of civilization and its increase of knowledge
and learning, the human intellect always played the greatest part, so
the nineteenth century placed great stress on the intellectual and
logical side of human culture, expecting that in time, man with pure
intellect and clear logic, would see everything and account for every-
thing in a logical, mathematical manner.
II
The main branches of culture are philosophy, religion, morality
and art.
These four branches of human endeavor in the nineteenth cen-
tury and especially the first two began almost to wilt away. Very
characteristic of the nineteenth century are the following phrases
in which the great pathologist Virchow raged at philosophy. "Phil-
osophy." he says, "was my enemy, from which I have fortunately
been saved : for it lured me to speculations full of dreams. But away
from philosophy I have taught myself to peer faithfully through
my microscope at facts as they are."
Such a view of philosophy was a dam in the way of the stream
of culture. It tore man away from all eternal values, the moral
value, which is the highest and most absolute in the world, included.
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The query of man—how much w'\\\ it avail his temporal life—be-
came much more imposing than the question—how valuble is it for
his being in eternity. In the eyes of man that view destroyed the
last morsel of such independent value which gave sustenance to the
life of him who saw in the independence of spirit the goal of every-
thing in the universe.
He who does not believe in the independence of spirit cannot
believe in his own independence. In all his behavior, in all his joys
and sorrows, he must depend upon everything in the world but him-
self. And wheresoever the independent "I" or profound "self" is
not at the root of an experience—that experience brings anything
but spiritual joy, and can lead to many things, but not to a higher
type of human being. With'this denial of the independence of spirit,
the last remnant of a logical basis for a desire on the part of man
to become a higher and more cultured being, was destroyed. The
effort to explain the highest through the lowest and to find a con-
crete, material expression for all that assumes the term "spirit," was
followed by an attempt to translate in a utilitarian manner all the
concepts of the higher, the better, and the more beautiful. Thus
the query, "what is this thing's true worth?" had to be reduced to
"how much can this thing yield in terms of weight and measure?"
Much more than all other values, moral values suffer from this
reduction of quality to quantity. For of all the values, the moral is
the most distinct from quantity and profoundest in quality ; of all
the values it is furthest from the arbitrary ; more than other values
it can exist with a minimum of externality ; more than other values
it can, in the flash of the eye, yield or snatch away an eternity of
bliss, and, more than any of the other values can it be identified
with what we understand by the term soul. And whenever the soul
is in exile, all the world is enslaved, much as we may strive to free it.
"What does it profit a man to free the whole world," asks Santa-
yana, "if his soul is not free? Moral freedom is not an artificial
condition, because the ideal is the mother-tongue of both the heart
and the senses. All that is requisite is that we should pause in liv-
ing to enjoy life, and should lift up our hearts to things that are pure
goods in themselves, so that once to have found them, no matter
what else may betide, may remain a happiness that nothing can
sully."
The second half of the nineteenth century did not know^ of such
a love for the pure good which lies hidden in every little furrow
and crevice of things, inasmuch as they are an expression of and
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through the spiritual reality. It was not aware of the bliss in which
the joy and pain of spirit are indistinguishable, and which is a kind
of alloy of joy and sorrow, generated from within and entirely free
and independent of all that lies external to the self. Such love, such
hliss were foreign to the Zeitgeist. It was an epoch which desired
^o commute all inner things for externals, and to reduce all that we
designate by the word soul to something which could be weighed
on the apothecary's scale. And the nearer that man was drawn
toward the external, and the more thoroughly that the qualitative
whole of the soul was quantitatively flitted away, the more com-
pletely did man begin to consider uses instead of values. Physical
adaptability instead of ethical fitness became the ideal of his conduct.
"The whc»le of the human world," says Tagore, "throughout its
iength and breadth, has felt the gravitational pull of a giant planet
of greed, with concentric rings of innumerable satellites, causing in
our society a marked deviation from the moral orbit. In former
times the intellectual and spiritual powers of this earth upheld their
dignity of independence and were not giddily rocked on the tides of
the money market."
Morality became neglected while materialism and civilization held
sway. Independence was perforce lost, and every meaning and value
of life vanished and with them every stimulus to spur life toward
profundity and loftiness instead of length and breadth.
Ill
Materialism then in all its length and breadth mastered human
thought in the latter decades of the nineteenth century.
The materialist conception sees in the high and complicated ex-
pression of the world an evolution from something lower and sim-
pler. It cannot therefore place before man, whom it regards as the
highest and most complex expression of everything in the world,
goals and purposes, ideas and ideals which should reach far above
man. Materialism desired, and for a short time it really believed
that it was actually able to reduce the immaterial and formless, the
spiritual and soulful to something, which is genuinely material and
concrete, and which has body and form. It endeavored to transmute
all that has quality into something that possesses mere quantity.
Hence, in the body (excellent enough material for the laboratory)
it saw the source and fountain head of the soul. Nothing served
to lead materialism to sense the abyss that separates the pleasure
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afforded by the satisfaction of bodily desires from the joy and bHss
which are experiences of the soul.
For where the very highest is only a degree of development from
the lower, where the heavenly is not considered in its essence and
reality entirely other than the earthly, the highest endeavors and
deepest desires of man cannot lift him so far and high into the upper
worlds that he can entirely forget the plane below. From the view-
point of materialism, the highest cannot differ from the lowest to
such a degree that an abyss could be created between them, nor can
the lowest, as from the idealist viewpoint, ever be considered as a
spark from the highest. The speculations about God. man and the
world, do not enjoy free swing, so as to enable the human eye to
escape the practical and worldly, and have in mind only the super-
human and divine.
It can therefore be readily understood why the role which civil-
ization played in contrast to culture was greatest and most signifi-
cant when the effect of materialism was most dominant and exten-
sive. Wherever the diffusion of materialism is widest, there culture
is devoured by the tide of civilization.
While materialism reigned supreme in all Europe, the sciences
recorded one victory after another over the vast ignorance which
persisted in regard to nature and its phenomena. Man became
plainly intoxicated with those victories and began to dream that
nature would soon lie open before him like a book and demand it
be read. At that time Marxian socialism came forth upon the world.
Marxism wove the materialistic W^eltanschauung pattern into soci-
ology and economics to such an extent that materialism, under the
mask of economic determinism, became the sine qua non of social-
ism as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels formulated and expounded
it. Today Marxism is differently understood, is interpreted in manv
ways by the various thinkers and leaders of the socialist movement.
But so long as they call themselves Marxists, they are agreed among
each other that they are philosophical materialists and aligned against
idealism. Their agreement is more obvious when they deal with
historical materialism—the conception which desires to see in the
means of production and in the socio-economical relations in gen-
eral, the chief factor of human development. Historical materialism
stubbornly insists on the possibility to reduce any by degrees, to re-
solve the highest to the lowest, the spiritual to the material, the ani-
mate to the inanimate, the valuable to the useful.
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In his book, Utopian and Scientific Socialism, Engels writes:
"The ultimate cause of all social changes and political revolutions
must be sought not in the human brain, not in man's keen insight
into external truth and justice, but in the varying phenomena of pro-
duction and exchange ; they are to be sought not in the philosophy,
but in the economics of each epoch."
And in the Communist Manifesto, both Marx and Engels explic-
itly state that deep intuition is not needed to realize that man's
thoughts, opinions, and conceptions, in a word, his consciousness, is
changed by every variation of his material existence, of his social
relationship, and social life.
IV
It is possible that just because the great thinkers who came alter
the Communist Manifesto was written, were gifted with great intui-
tion, they did not take at all seriously the philosophical foundation
of Marxism, and paid little attention to materialism in general.
For after all, materialism as a philosophical view of the world
was never an outgrowth of philosophy. It was born on the lap of
natural science, and for a long time served as an excellent motive
force for all the searchings and investigations concerning problems
which could sooner or later, in an experimental manner, be positively
explained. So soon, however, as philosophy, which deals in the
main with questions outside of the bounds of positivity, threw upon
materialism its cognizatory rays and peered deep into reality, mate-
rialism thawed like ice under the rays of the sun.
How far-reaching the idealistic reaction of the human thought
of today has been against science and materialism. Professor Alliota
has demonstrated most conclusively in his book. The Idealistic Reac-
tion /^gainst Science. "Pure mechanics," says Professor Alliota,
"are then the basis and general form of all physical science ; but
though, space, time, and motion are necessary, they are not sufficient
to exhaust the whole content of external experience. In every nat-
ural phenomenon, there will always be found something mechanical
:
it will therefore be found essential in every branch of physical sci-
ence to integrate with the help of other explanatory concepts, the
universal principles of mechanics which merely present to us the
universal form of physical reality, the warp with which he who
would weave an intelligible world, cannot dispense. There should.
however, be as few as possible of these integrating elements ; and it
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will always be permissible to attempt to resolve into these four con-
cepts the new phenomena revealed to us by experience, transmuting
them into an ideal form in which our intelligence may recognize
itself. What, indeed, can be the aim of the age-long work of sci-
ence, if it be not to bring to light the thought contained in the inti-
mate nature of things?"
Historical materialism can come to no better end than philosophi-
cal materialism. For both are products of the same cognition. Both
are developments of the self-same bent of thought, results of the
self-same quality of human temperament. Therefore, in spite of the
fact that Marxism in order to confirm its historical materialism made
great effort to nullify all the idealistic philosophers from Plato to
Hegel himself upside down, all great philosophers of recent years
follow more closely in the footsteps of Plato. Aristotle, Descartes,
Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel.
All these philosophers, like Bergson, Wundt, Eucken, James,
Royce, Dewey, Mach, Avenarius, Hartmann, Schopenhauer, ]\Iuen-
sterberg. Nietzsche, Spencer, and Bradley—who diverge into so
many different directions, and from each direction into again as
many different viewpoints concerning the relations existing between
the world, man and God, all join in their negative attitude toward
materialism, in their sharp criticism of materialism as it was formu-
lated by many natural scientists, and as it was, in its historico-mate-
rialistic sense, applied in the supposedly strictly scientific foundation
of socialism.
Josiah Royce has passed the verdict of present-day philosophy in
his The World and the Individual. "For us," he says, "Nature is
an expression of mental life, and all mental life has an internal
meaning, and therefore conscious unity of purpose in every pulse
of its existence.
"And for the same reason, we reject a form of doctrine that re-
gards nature as in any sense a realm of the genuinely unconscious,
or that supposes the absolute to come to self-consciousness first in
man. or that conceives the process of evolution as one wherein the
life of the natural, as a whole, grows from the darkness of obscurity
and unconscious purpose to the daylight of self-possessed reason.
Our general theory of Being simply forbids every such interpreta-
tion of X^ature. All life, everywhere, insofar as it is life, has con-
scious meaning, and accomplishes a rational end. This is the neces-
sary consequence of Idealism. Where we see inorganic nature seem-
ingly dead, there is, in fact, conscious life just as surely as there is
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any Being present in Nature at all. And I insist, meanwhile, that no
empirical warrant can be found for affirming the existence of dead
material substance anywhere. What we find in inorganic Nature,
are processes whose time-rate is faster or slower than those which
our consciousness is adapted to read or to appreciate. And we
have no empirical evidence of the existence of any, relatively whole,
conscious process, which is less intelligent or less rational than our
own human processes are."
This revolution in the philosophical thought of the twentieth
century sl'wuld, if there were an appreciable number of serious think-
ing people among the radical, and especially among the socialist,
folks cause them to bethink themselves of the possibility of a Wel-
tanschaung opposed to the materialistic conception, which gives
human life a deeper meaning and a greater content. For the newest
philosophy was immersed in, and drenched with, all those scientific
speculations of the nineteenth century, which drove inevitably to the
confirmation of the materialistic Weltanschaung. It had become
acquainted in the most intimate manner with all the efforts of trium-
phant science to drive out the concept of spirit as a first cause and
the ultimate aim of all worldly happenings. Out of regard for the
gigantic achievements of science, philosophy was for several decades
silent. But it did begin to speak anew, and whenever materialism
was concerned, to speak over and over again in the very words used
by the profoundest thinkers of the distant past.
The very fact that during a stretch of twenty-five centuries, the
profoundest thinkers of the world stubbornly held to the idea that
the essence of the world cannot be something which has neither will
nor reason, neither plan nor compass, ought to have brought to an
end, the levity with which the radical, and particularly the socialist
ranks treated such conjectures as that an atom is the outcome of an
idea and not that an idea is the result of the existence of atoms.
Moreover, now science itself, through its most brilliant represen-
tatives, begins to realize that something lacking will and understand-
ing can in no way be considered the cause of something which has
will and understanding.
The verdict of science is epitomized in the words of J- Arthur
Thomson : "Living transcends all mechanical description."
Tn regards to life and spirit, there begins to reign a unanimous
opinion not only in philosophy but also in science, and that opinion
is that life cannot be explained in terms of anything other than life.
Says Viscount Haldane: "It is only in terms of life itself that life
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can be expressed, and these terms lie outside the words which the
physicist has to employ. Of course, physical and chemical concep-
tions have great \a\ue in the observation of the organism. They are
needed in order to interpret certain aspects of the taking in and giv-
ing out of its energy, aspects which it presents in common with the
other objects of external nature. But such aspects are inadequate
to the full reality. They are not more than abstractions under which
that reality can be properly regarded only if it is remembered that
in them no complete or even sufficient account of life is ever given.
And end operates quite dififerently from a cause. Its activity is a
present activity—behavior and not causation. Our knowledge about
it is determined by a dififerent set of conceptions."
This means that all causes which have brought life to the world,
all factors that motivate life, lie hidden within life itself, and by no
means in something foreign to life. Life is a self-reproducing
process. J- Arthur Thomson, again well says "for certain purposes
it is not amiss to think of the organism as an engine, but it is a self-
stoking, self-repairing, self-preservative, self-adjusting, self-increas-
ing, self-reproducing machine."
It is the same with spirit.
Spirit likewise cannot be explained by any incident outside of
itself. The only definition that can be given for spirit is that spirit
is spirit. Spirit is that force which is able to produce itself and all
else and which cannot be brought forth from anv other substance
;
and outside of spirit there is nothing, for whatsoever in the world
we should choose to name cannot be placed outside of the spirit,
since the .laminsr and the calling themselves are spiritual processes
—expressions of human thought. And just as it is impossible to
imagine seas and rivers without water—for it is the water which
forms the river and sea-beds in the soil, so it is impossible to imagine
anything without spirit ; for an object is primarily a consciousness,
a concept, and it is the spirit which carves out in us and around us
the concept and the consciousness of the object.
\Y\th just this in mind, Bradley writes the last paragraph of his
great book Appearance and Reality. "And Reality is one experience,
self-pervading and superior to mere relations. Its character is oppo-
site of that fabled extreme which is barely mechanical, and it is. in
the end. the sole perfect realization. We may fairlv close this work-
then bv insisting that Reality is spiritual. There is a great saving of
Hegel's, a saving too well known, and one which without some
explanation I should not like to endorse. But I will end with some-
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thing not very different, something perhaps more certainly the mes-
sage of Hegel. Outside of spirit, there is not and cannot be, any
reality, and the more that anything is spirtual, so much the more is
it veritably real."
In the same vein Professor Alliota, also speaks, when he says:
"The reality of nature presupposes the reality of consciousness as its
essential epistemological basis. Thus we do but move in a vicious
circle when we try to derive thought from die world of mechanics or
energetics, since there is nothing left of that world when the con-
cepts, principles, and ideas used by conscious activity in its construc-
tion have been eliminated.
Thus write the profoundest philosophers and scientists of our
time in the spirit of Philosopher Berkeley's declaration of long ago
•
—that matter is of little use for natural philosophy.
What does this mean but that quantity can be qualitatively evalu-
ated but never vice versa.
The tendency of the twentieth century is toward the full re-
affirmation of the hypothesis that quality cannot be reduced to quan-
tity. This tendency has led the thinkers of our day to invest time
itself with quality and differentiation.
Time has ceased to be a homogeneous mental emanation, a pure
abstraction in which events occur. Instead, it is gradually being
seen as in a metaphysical womb whence all events are urged forth.
Time itself becomes concrete. Accordingly its three expressions
—
the past, the present, and the future—are each bound to have a cer-
tain individuality. And thus a previous expression cannot completely
mould an expression following and by no means explain or predict it.
Such a concept of time and its resultant demand for the differen-
tiation between time and space as thought entities were already inti-
mated by Hegel. He accepted that "mentality" in which Kant
frames his concepts of time and space, but he insisted on qualitative
differentiation which time and not space possess.
Cntil Bergson came forth with creative evolution and Einstein;
with the theory of relativity, our century did not pause to think of
Hegel's highly significant remark about the specific properties and
about the uniqueness of time.
In their treatment of time, both Hegel and Bergson come to
somewhat similar conclusions.
In this close approach is indicated, or reflected, the nearness be-
tween the thought trends of the beginning of the nineteenth and the
beginning of the twentieth century. In both periods, much impor-
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tance was attached to (juality. But between these two periods, the
latter half of the nineteenth century injected its emphasis of quan-
tity instead of quality, and also intellectual abstraction instead of
sentient concreteness. ]\rarxism fell into this pitfall which as we
have seen, present-day thinking carefully avoids. Philosophy and
science are gradually coming together on this point.
And since there are no higher courts of issue than science and
philosophy which together are the expression of culture, the "radi-
cal sociology" with its zest for considering itself a science will there-
fore be unable to both forsake its cultural heritage and at the same
time to stubbornly tread its materialistic measures, when all the pres-
ent march of thought is permeated with idealism or spiritualism.
And the more thoroughly idealism will pervade the human mind,
the more completely will culture dominate human activity, control
human life and direct the growth and influence of civilization.
